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NO. 39 JULY 2020 Introduction 
The Indian-Chinese Confrontation 
in the Himalayas 
A Stress Test for India’s Strategic Autonomy 
Christian Wagner 
The confrontation between Indian and Chinese troops in the Himalayas, which has 
been ongoing since the beginning of May, has escalated into the most serious crisis 
in relations between the two countries in 45 years. On 15 June, for the first time since 
1975, 20 Indian and an unknown number of Chinese soldiers were killed in an inci-
dent. The current crisis, unlike previous ones, has wider territorial and political 
dimensions. It shakes the previous border regime and strains the relationship of trust 
that was laboriously built up between Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President 
Xi Jinping. The confrontation is also a test of India’s strategic autonomy. This corner-
stone of Indian foreign policy also includes the claim to an independent role in the 
geostrategic tensions between China and the United States in the Indo-Pacific. 
 
The unresolved border issue in the Hima-
layas has been a burden on Chinese-Indian 
relations for decades. India suffered a mili-
tary defeat in the border war with China 
in 1962, which still has an impact in many 
political discussions today. In the course of 
their political rapprochement from the late 
1980s onwards, the current Line of Actual 
Control (LAC) was established in 1993. How-
ever, it is not clearly defined, as there are 
competing territorial claims on as many as 
18 places. 
The current confrontation in the western 
sector of the Ladakh region, which belongs 
to Kashmir, differs in several ways from 
earlier ones. Firstly, this time there are ter-
ritorial violations not just in one, but in 
five places. Secondly, it appears that far 
more Chinese troops are involved than in 
previous incidents. Thirdly, China is now 
claiming areas, such as the Galwan Valley, 
that were previously not disputed. The 
current confrontation seems to be due to 
a mixture of regional factors, such as the 
Kashmir conflict and growing geostrategic 
tensions between China, the United States, 
and India in the Indo-Pacific. 
Kashmir and Its Consequences 
Many Indian experts see the Modi govern-
ment’s decision in August 2019 to dissolve 
the state of Jammu and Kashmir as a trigger 
for the current crisis. In the course of the 
reorganisation of Kashmir, two new union 
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territories were created – including Ladakh 
– which are administered from New Delhi. 
In addition to Pakistan, China had protested 
against this decision at the time and had 
pushed through an informal meeting of the 
United Nations Security Council on the In-
dian decision. China sees its interests being 
threatened in the Aksai Chin region, which 
belongs to Kashmir (see map). The People’s 
Republic has occupied this region, which 
contains an important access road to Tibet, 
since the border war of 1962. 
Since August 2019, India has continued 
to expand its military infrastructure in 
Ladakh, while at the same time reaffirming 
its historical claim to the whole of Kashmir. 
The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, the 
largest single project of the Chinese Silk 
Road Initiative, also runs through the Paki-
stani part of Kashmir. The Chinese terri-
torial violations can thus be seen as a reac-
tion to Indian policy in Kashmir in recent 
months. 
China’s territorial gains to date are a 
serious strategic problem for India. Chinese 
control of the Galwan Valley threatens 
India’s main supply road, which runs along 
the LAC and Shyok River from Darbuk to 
Daulat Beg Oldie in northern Ladakh (see 
map). There, near the Karakorum Pass to 
China, India maintains an airfield at an alti-
tude of about 5,000 metres, which is of 
utmost importance for the supply of Indian 
troops on the Siachen Glacier. The glacier 
is the highest war zone in the world, where 
Indian and Pakistani troops have faced each 
other since the mid-1980s. 
India, China, and the United 
States in the Indo-Pacific 
The current confrontation is also related to 
the geopolitical rivalries in the Indo-Pacific 
between China on the one hand, and India 
and the United States on the other. India 
refuses to join the Chinese Silk Road Initia-
tive, through which the government in Bei-
jing has massively expanded its influence 
in India’s neighbourhood in South Asia and 
the Indian Ocean in recent years. This ap-
plies not only to Pakistan, which is a stra-
tegic partner of China, and to countries 
such as Sri Lanka, Nepal, and Bangladesh, 
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but also to the island states in the Indian 
Ocean. 
Starting in 2017, India – together with 
Australia, Japan, and the United States – 
revived the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue 
(Quad), which was created in 2007. Since 
then, the four states have expanded their 
political, economic, and military coopera-
tion to address China’s geopolitical ambi-
tions and its Silk Road Initiative. 
Despite the rapprochement with the 
United States and increasing tensions with 
China, India continues to emphasise its 
strategic autonomy. This includes the claim 
to an independent role in the geopolitical 
tensions between China and the United 
States in the Indo-Pacific. In recent years, 
India and China have also repeatedly co-
operated, for example in the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organisation. Within the Quad, 
India has advocated an inclusive under-
standing of the Indo-Pacific, which, in 
contrast to the United States, has always 
included China. 
In China there is not only resentment 
about India’s decision on Kashmir but also 
growing criticism of India’s rapprochement 
with the United States and its closer mili-
tary cooperation. The recent claims on 
areas along the LAC are also partly seen as 
“revenge” for the Doklam crisis of 2017. 
At the time, China had pushed ahead with 
infrastructure projects in an area that 
Bhutan also claimed; India had prevented 
these projects by intervening. From this 
perspective, the current incidents at the 
LAC are a kind of “punitive action” by 
which the Chinese leadership signals its 
dissatisfaction with India’s behaviour. 
Challenges for India’s 
China Policy 
Prime Minister Modi’s statement on 19 June 
that there had been no violation of Indian 
territory underlined the desire to continue 
with the current policy towards China, de-
spite the gravity of the current crisis. How-
ever, India’s China policy now faces much 
greater challenges. 
Firstly, the border regime, which was 
established in the 1990s, is being called into 
question. Following their rapprochement 
at the end of the 1980s, India and China 
signed five agreements and developed a 
number of confidence-building measures 
with regard to the LAC, such as a ban on 
the use of firearms in the event of incidents. 
Since 1989, the two states have maintained 
a joint working group to clarify the border’s 
alignment. Both sides also appointed spe-
cial representatives for the border issue – 
by 2019 they had met 22 times in total. 
Secondly, the current crisis is a setback 
for Prime Minister Modi as well. After the 
Doklam crisis of 2017, he established close 
personal relations with President Xi like he 
had with no other head of state or govern-
ment. With informal summits in Wuhan 
in 2018 and Mahabalipuram in 2019, they 
sought to overcome the strategic differences 
between their states. Possible territorial 
losses would also be a stress test for Modi’s 
nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), 
since it stands for the territorial unity of 
the country more strongly than any other 
party. 
Thirdly, the crisis once again shows that 
India has few options to put pressure on 
China. The People’s Republic, with which 
India has its largest trade deficit, has been 
its most important trading partner for 
years. In 2019 China was the third-largest 
market for Indian exports. Chinese technol-
ogy companies have invested more heavily 
in Indian start-up companies in recent 
years. In November 2019, the Indian gov-
ernment withdrew at the last minute from 
the Regional Comprehensive Economic 
Partnership agreement, which would have 
increased the trade deficit with China. 
Even before the crisis, the Indian govern-
ment had already tightened the conditions 
for foreign investors – a move that was 
mainly directed against Chinese companies. 
Nationalist groups associated with the BJP 
called for a boycott of Chinese goods. They 
feel encouraged by Prime Minister Modi’s 
new economic policy credo of self-reliance. 
The aim is to reduce imports and stimulate 
domestic production. As a reaction to the 
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tensions, the clearance of Chinese imports 
to India has been delayed, among other 
things. Indian state companies in turn can-
celled orders to Chinese companies. Indian 
companies, however, pointed out that they 
were highly dependent on Chinese imports, 
which could not be compensated for with-
out higher costs. Given the structure of 
trade relations, India’s restrictions on Chi-
nese companies could even prove counter-
productive. Furthermore, the Indian gov-
ernment banned Chinese apps at the end 
of June, and Prime Minister Modi deleted 
his official page on the Chinese platform 
Weibo. 
Prospects 
Despite the looming détente along the LAC, 
both sides are strengthening their military 
presence in the region. Further escalation 
is threatened not only by incidents such as 
the one in the Galwan Valley, but also by 
territorial violations elsewhere along the 
more than 3,400-kilometre-long border. In 
addition, a new dispute is looming between 
China and Bhutan, which led to the Doklam 
crisis with India in 2017. Pakistan’s involve-
ment in the conflict would have even 
greater potential for escalation. 
The big challenge for India and China is 
to find a solution that is in line with their 
tactical and strategic interests. India is in-
terested in establishing the status quo ante 
and a stable border regime without moving 
parts of the LAC to the west. This would 
allow Modi to continue his current China 
policy. The alternative would be to turn 
more strongly to the United States, as 
demanded by many security experts. How-
ever, this would undermine one of the 
pillars of Indian foreign policy: the concept 
of strategic autonomy. For it would also 
mean admitting that India alone is not in 
a position to counter the threat from China. 
For a nationalist party such as the BJP, 
which has taken up the cause of economic 
and foreign policy autonomy and the claim 
to act on an equal footing with China, this 
would be a bitter defeat with presumably 
far-reaching domestic and foreign policy 
consequences. China, for its part, does not 
want its successes at the LAC to encourage 
India to turn to the United States, which it 
has always tried to prevent. This could also 
set in motion a militarisation of the Quad, 
which India has always rejected. Beijing 
would then have paid dearly for its tactical 
gains in the Himalayas: with a strategic set-
back in the geopolitical tensions with the 
United States and the Quad in the Indo-
Pacific. 
In view of its economic and military 
inferiority to China, India will massively 
expand its arms cooperation with European 
partners as a result of the crisis. After years 
of close military cooperation with France, 
New Delhi will increasingly bring this re-
quest to the attention of German policy-
makers. 
Dr Christian Wagner is Senior Fellow in the Asia Division. 
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